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English is constantly moving forward and elucidates its role as lingua franca in the European 
Union. At the same time the Union has 20 official languages and promotes around 150 regional 
or minority languages under its official motto United in diversity; expressing the view that each 
member state should promote its national language and identity simultaneously as their citizens 
are to feel like Europeans. This can be looked upon as a contradiction in terms because diversity 
can juxtapose unity although in this paper we conclude the opposite by investigating the 
relationship between language, identity and the process of European integration. Taking as a 
point of departure the fact that language is a crucial part of our identity, we argue that language as 
such does not have to be an obstacle for the development of ‘an ever closer Union’ in Europe if 
the general discourses are made transparent on each level of political decision-making, i.e. the 
regional, national and supranational level. We see the Union as the individual languages’ and 
hence identities’ advocate, defending a democratic diversity in Europe at the same time as three 
main working languages – English, French and German – are ensuring its necessary unity under 
some kind of confederal or federal supranational political system.1 
 
An ever closer Union  
Going back to the Treaty on European Union from Maastricht 1991, Daniel Elazar (1995), 
William Safran (1997) and Daniel Wincott (1996) see the introduction of this treaty as the most 
important change in the history of the European Community/Union since it was set up in the 
1950s. It strengthened the supranational element in what for Elazar already at that time was a 
confederation of independent nation-states ‘in fact if not in name’ (Elazar 1995:5). He even 
argued that the European Community was close to the federal idea already in the 1960s. 
 
Though the American conception of federalism is today almost universally 
accepted as the most accurate usage, the confederal conception remains a 
living and legitimate aspect of the federal idea in its largest political sense. 
Today, the latter is most prominent among certain advocates of limited 
European union (the common Market exemplifies a confederal form) and 
among many so-called world federalists” (Elazar 1968:354-355). 
 
The most important way of strengthening the supranational, or more correctly supra-state level 
of the European Union in 1991, was the establishment of a European citizenship giving 
Europeans with national citizenship in one of the member states the right to vote or being 
                                                 
1
 Thanks to Christopher Lord for commenting on aspects of this article and for comments from colleagues in 
Department of Political Science and Management, Agder University College, in Barcelona Seminar May 2006.  
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candidate in local elections and for the European Parliament in other member states. 
Furthermore, such a trans-national universal right for European citizens was also introduced for 
petitions directly to the European Parliament and for the possibility to complain to the Union’s 
Ombudsman. 
 With the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 the supra-state element of the European Union was 
further emphasised through what can be characterised as a process of positive integration. Focus 
was no longer only on the development of what we see as negative rights of freedom at the 
supra-state level, such as civil and political rights linked to the citizenship of a member state, but 
also on positive rights for the pursuit of things like social and economic welfare fostered by the 
supra-state institutions of the Union as a political system per se. This made the European Union 
look much more like a supra-state confederal or federal political system than it seems from the 
intergovernmental treaties it is based upon (Grindheim 2004).  
First with the introduction of a new treaty article on fundamental human rights (F1), 
which was further strengthened in Nice 2000 with the agreement on a European Charter on 
Human Rights and in the proposed constitution (2004) where it has been made into Title II: 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union, and might in the future be developed even 
further into a European Bill of Rights like the one to be found in the American Constitution. 
Secondly, with a new article to fight discrimination on the basis of sex, race or ethnic origin, 
religion or faith, age or sexual orientation, plus an appendix on the possibilities for positive 
discrimination of disabled people (Art. 6a). Thirdly, with a new article saying that the Community 
should aim at eliminating inequalities and promote equality between women and men (Art. 2 and 
3). And fourthly, by introducing the principle of ‘citizens first’ and by that bringing the Union 
closer to the basic ideas of the Rome Treaty  
 
which referred to an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe – they have 
acknowledged a common element in the body politic which constitutes the 
Union. This provision strongly enhances the justification for the use of 
concepts of federalism in the analysis of the European Community/ European 
Union, as individuals now have citizenship rights at both the national and 
supranational levels (Wincott 1996:409). 
 
But, even though the European Union has made considerable progress towards a political system 
united in diversity with something like a confederal or federal supra-state institutional structure, it 
is widely held that it suffers from an identity problem when public opinion is taken into 
consideration (Eriksen and Fossum 2004, Fossum 2001, 2003, Kumm 2005, Schlesinger 1997). 
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Language is the most frequently mentioned challenge, being an alleged obstacle towards further 
integration and cooperation within the Union (Archibugi 2005).  
A thorough look at language and identity in relation to the process of European 
integration, however, has made us reconsider language as a problem. Our claim is that the divide 
made up of different languages is not an obstacle towards the development of ‘an ever closer 
Union’ in Europe. Because, as Christopher Lord (1998: 108) says, the kind of identity that the 
Union will need to achieve this, ‘depend on the kind of democracy it purports to be’.  
 
Language and identity 
Language is an inevitable part of human identity. As Erik O. Eriksen (1991) and Philip 
Schelsinger (2005) argue, the most crucial part. And identity is something that is constituted in 
different levels. The internal relationship between the factors that make up our identity is varying 
and therefore difficult to define. One thing is although clear, something which is familiar to all of 
us, that we are identified according to how we speak even if people we are talking to are not able 
to see us. Linguistic diversity creates a distinction because we look upon people by the way they 
are talking. For instance as for dialects because they are a hallmark of difference: in the 
Scandinavian countries dialects are mainly connected with the region you are living in or even 
with the local community, in Great Britain primarily with social class, in the US they talk about 
different sociolects like Afro-American or Hispanic street languages in urban areas, showing that 
’language’ is a dynamic process based on constantly changing distinctions. In Belgium, for 
example, two different linguistic communities have developed their own forms of national 
identity (Keating 2001: vii), whereas in Switzerland four linguistic communities (and two 
religions) have managed to create one nation with multiple identities (Linder 1994).  
Our question is if a shared collective identity presupposes a shared language, as Daniele 
Archibugi (2005) and Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt (2004) argue pertaining to the 
European Union. Or can translation build bridges between split languages? English is the lingua 
franca of Europe and the Western World. But will it ever be formally adopted as the only language 
within the European Union? Or do national languages play too strong a role concerning identity 
in this case? (Bartolini 2005: 213, Schlesinger 2005). A Eurobarometer survey shown in figure 1 
make us ask the questions.  
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Figure 1 Europeans and their languages (percent)
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Tend to agree Tend to disagree DK
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 243 (2006).  
 
 
Although 70 percent of Europeans in this survey tend to agree with the statement that everybody 
in the Union should be able to speak a common language, only 55 percent agree that the 
European institutions should use only one language when communicating with its citizens. This 
speaks in favor of multiculturalism and thereby also multilingualism. People want to be able to 
continue using their own language but at the same time they recognise the need for speaking a 
more globalised language as well. As can be seen from figure 2 (next page) quite a few EU 
citizens also report to have read a book, newspaper or magazine over the last 12 months, with 
great variations between northern and southern Europe and between small and big countries.  
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Figure 2 Read a book, newspaper or magazine 
in a language other than your mother tongue 
in the last 12 months
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 251 (2006).  
 
 
We know that multicultural societies tend to decrease national identities, which can be said to be 
in favor of the possibility to develop a common European identity (Christopher Lord, p.c.) and 
supporting our argument about language not being an obstacle to this.  
Stein Rokkan expresses a similar view about languages and identities, here in the words of 
Peter Flora (1999: 171): ‘While language is only one of several expressions of identity, it is the 
most pervasive and obvious stigma of distinctiveness’. For Rokkan language played a major role 
in the nation-building processes of European states after the French Revolution in 1789, but as 
he argued back in the 1970s 
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The building of a national territorial community in fact forced the great 
majority of subjects into some level of bilinguality: one language for close 
interaction within the immediate community, and at least one other for 
communication over longer distances. The first is the language of the home 
and local friendship circle, the other of markets, networks of external contacts, 
and agencies of control and administration (ibid.) 
 
If we look metaphorically upon the European Union as a community, this description fits to the 
point: National languages are mainly used within the borders of the nation-state, while English, 
French and German are the main working languages at the intergovernmental and supra-state 
level of the Union. Most people do also report to have one of the three languages as their second 
or third language, depending upon where they come from: North-West of Europe/New Central 
and Eastern European member states (English), Continental Europe (German) and Southern 
Europe (French). Especially common is English but after the enlargement of the European 
Union 1 May 2004 we see that the balance between French and German is changing and that 
Russian is becoming a language of transnational communication in the Union, cf. figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 What languages Europeans speak (percent)
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 243 (2006), based upon EB 55.1 for 2001 and EB 64.3 for 2005. 
 
 
The current view upon the relationship between language and identity among most researchers 
concerning identity-development in the EU is like Mattias Kumm (2005: 59-60) has pointed out: 
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‘The absence of a well-developed public sphere in Europe and a common language in particular 
presents a considerable obstacle for such an [robust European] identity to develop.’ If so, what 
does the term national identity contain?  
Anthony Smith (1991), proposes five characteristics of national identity 
 
 a historical territory or homeland 
 common myths and historical memories 
 common mass public culture 
 common legal rights and duties for all members 
 a common economy with territorial mobility for members  
 
One factor is missing here, in fact the main asset in Rokkan’s theory: a common language that the 
majority of the population speaks. It could be a part of ‘common mass public culture’ but it is 
inevitable an essential part of our identity that should be specified. We define national identity as 
something which presupposes a nation and a language,2 and therefore we can not speak of 
national identities before nations and states have developed.3 
Concerning the EU, the first attempt at establishing some kind of a formal common 
European identity came at the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau in June 1984 (Burgess 
2000: 160). Since then, much has happened and many attempts have been made on shaping a 
more coherent identity. Now it is clear that the European Union is affecting the identities of its 
member states (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005: 4). The feeling of belonging to a united community 
creates either a weakened national identity or a stronger feeling of being European, as figure 4 
(next page) might be an indication of.  
 
                                                 
2
 As an implication of the need for cleavages: ‘Collective identity – a sense of “we” against “them” – is both an 
important consequence of political mobilization processes and a precondition for the ability to transform 
“objective” conflicts to subjectively perceived political cleavages’ (Aardal and Waldahl 2004: 253-254). 
 
3
 We do not attempt to draw a firm distinction between the concepts of nation and state. Following Sweeney 
(2005), we recognise that state differs from nation insofar as the former invokes territoriality and a government.  
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Figure 4 How European are Europeans? (percent)
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 251 (2006).  
 
 
This also affects the relationship between democratisation and identity because either a weakened 
or strengthened identity is assumed to have democratic consequences. Lord (2003) states that 
democratisation and identity stand in a relationship where the former presupposes an 
understanding of the latter. We cannot talk about the European Union being democratic or not 
without realising that we need to know how identity so to speak ‘works’ (see also Lord 2004). In 
our framework, where identity is intertwined with language, we see that it is crucial both for the 
European Union and the member states to retain their diversity. Weakened national identities 
entail that the EU should increase their strength by supporting the national and minority 
languages. This is as all know also status quo. It therefore seems that the Union is balancing the 
loss of national identity by way of supporting the outmost important element of one’s identity: 
the languages. The question now becomes: Is our view of language and identity empirically 
supported? We will address this below, but first some notes about language and nation-states. 
Elisabeth Bakke (1995) argues against the view that a common (written) language is a 
prerequisite for people to feel like a nation, because nations exists that do not share languages 
with each other. We disagree on the grounds that for the people of these nations language is a 
specific part of their identity but that does not automatically imply that they have a common 
identity. People from the United States and England speaks English (with minor dialectal 
differences), but have quite different identities where the language plays an important part of 
making them Americans and English.  
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We follow Eriksen (1991) who emphasises that a state is not in need of one national 
language in order to be a state. Furthermore, he says that an identity is only meaningful when you 
are able to contrast it with other identities, as Bernt Aardal and Ragnar Waldahl (2004) also argue. 
Within the European Union, with its 20 official languages, this is very much the case. Languages 
are one important part of it, historical circumstances another. Hence, The European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has also respect for linguistic and cultural diversity enshrined in it (European 
Commission 2004: 8). Furthermore, the Union’s officials and politicians are naturally aware of 
the relationship between identity and language, and the effort put upon translation is a way of 
showing this, as well as its cultural responsibility. 
We see that the European Union balances the need for a European identity and a national 
identity by how the languages of the Union are supported. If the Union had chosen otherwise, 
the consequences could have been fatal. It is often said that the belongingness to a linguistic 
community is only made pertinent when the community is threatened by extinction (Eriksen 
1991). This is only assumptions since the history turned out otherwise. Recent research seems to 
speak in favor of our position. Hans Jörg Trenz (2005) shows that there are changes in how 
people conceive of the European Union in regions where the Union’s initiatives have provided a 
positive development for their language. If the Union is able to keep up this work, it could very 
well be that the European identity slightly changes in a more positive way throughout the Union. 
 
The way they talk  
Stein Rokkan argued decades ago that ‘The more diversified a community, the more the 
diacritical marks may prove important in defending separate identities without interfering with 
specific exchanges in daily life’ (cited in Flora 1999: 208). Switzerland is the best example: The 
nation-state does not have a supra-national language but consists of four different languages: 
German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romance. Thereby the inhabitants of Switzerland do not 
have such a strong feeling of belongingness and it is necessary to strengthen this feeling, which 
has been done in various ways (Corbellari 2005). 
The example of Switzerland may anyhow be considered an argument against the 
hypotheses that language is the hallmark of identity, insofar as it after all constitutes a nation. 
Other nations where this applies are e.g. Belgium (national level), Spain (regional level) and Italy 
(local level).  As said above, a state is not in need of just one language in order to be a state. 
Despite multiple languages they do indeed function as a coherent unity with a rather strange 
feeling of identity. The parallel to the European Union is striking: In both cases we have a large 
community with a multitude of languages spoken and allowed. Since these countries after all are 
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nation-states, this entails that the European project is not doomed to fail on the grounds of 
multilingualism. 
Language and identity can also be interconnected in another way. In pursuing the goal of 
developing a common European identity it is important to consider to what extent people of 
Europe have a mutual understanding of the ‘European language’, a metaphor describing the 
language which exists in Brussels and among executives in the member states. Just as we can 
speak of a ‘football language’, a ‘linguistic language’ and a ‘political science language’, we can 
speak of this ‘European language’ or European jargon. Every organisation, institution or 
academic field has its own jargon, a vocabulary normally understandable just for those within this 
field, and its own discourse strategies and ‘way of talking’.  
One problem with the European Union is that most people probably do not understand 
the European jargon and therefore easily speak about a lack of information and hence a 
democratic deficit within the Union. But how much do they understand of what politicians at the 
regional and nation-state levels in Europe talk about when they are together? The jargon of 
politicians in general can be hard to get a grip of, even when watching debates on television or 
reading disputes in newspapers or at the Internet. Moreover, is it really necessary for everyone to 
understand the language of politicians when the politicians speak among themselves?  
All member states of the EU have a multilevel system of government with representative 
democratic institutions at local, regional and national level, and in fact we only have to 
understand the jargon or language of politicians and their parties when deciding for elections at 
the different levels in order to evaluate if they are doing the job they said they would do at the 
next election. This is not to say that politicians necessarily are or should be creating a distance 
towards their electorates, but that politics as any other sector of society even at the national, 
regional and local level constitutes its own ‘language’ which simply can not be ‘open’ to all if its 
going to function for the best of all. 
 Accounts of lack of integration in the European Union and its relation to language and 
identity have taken languages as the main problem per se. Data show some opposing tendencies. 
By now, we know that ‘there is strong evidence that many of those who live in the European 
Union already have a multi-tired sense of belonging’ (Lord 1998: 111). Building a European 
identity has to start from scratch as there is no kind of primordial identity to build up on, as Lord 
(1998: 114) argues. Suggestions go in the direction of creating a European identity the same way 
as European nation-states once developed theirs (Eriksen and Fossum 2004, Fossum 2001, 2003, 
Holsen 1998), and that the political and social citizenship is vital in order to create this kind of 
identity (Holsen 1998).  
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The main problem regarding this is that the European Union is not a post-national unity 
of the kind that the above theories require. It seems quite clear that the term ‘post-national’ is 
inappropriate. Consequently, a European identity cannot be build like the national ones due to 
historical circumstances (Rokkan 1983, 1999) and because the Union does not have a primordial 
identity to build upon. The European Union is something new, which merits new invented tools, 
and hence, our claim that language is not a problem for the Union would make better sense if it 
was possible to transform the general discourses from one country and one language to another 
country and another language. Especially with respect to the Union itself and the communication 
with its member states. We therefore turn to a discussion about translation, which in fact 
supports our claim that language as such does not have to be an obstacle for the development of 
‘an ever closer Union’ in Europe. 
 
Lost in translation? 
The European Union is using a lot of time and money translating papers and in meetings. One 
sentence makes one sentence is the principle behind this, which is a way of working that is 
different from how translations are made in literature or in newspaper-articles where translations 
are based on the larger meaning and context as a basis. Translating one to one can be quite 
difficult if the meaning is to remain identical. Only future studies can tell us if the national 
languages in the European Union are changing because of this strategy, meaning that texts will be 
formulated in a way that makes them easier translatable. As an example is the EU already using 
machine translations extensively, but the texts are always post-edited by humans.  
At present, much work is therefore put upon creating a well-written original text. The 
Directorate-General for Translation (DGT) has an editing service whose task it is to improve the 
language of original texts before translation (DGT 2005: 6). Draft legislations and draft policy 
papers in the European Commission are produced in one or more of the three working languages 
of the Union, whereas the final texts are only translated into all the Union’s languages at the end 
stage (European Commission 2004: 19). In the European Parliament, the situation is different, 
insofar as they have developed a system of six ‘pivot’ languages, which are English, French, 
German, Italian, Polish and Spanish (European Commission 2004: 19). 
Inasmuch as the Parliament has to translate many documents into all languages rapidly, it 
would have required an enormous amount of translators if for example a Spanish document was 
to be translated into all the other 19 languages. Instead, it is translated into the pivot languages 
and then translated further. The same procedure is used when e.g. the European Parliament has a 
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joint discussion and interpreters turn to one of the ‘pivot’ languages. Thus, we have a three-step 
process in translating which can be illustrated like in figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Translation process in European Parliament and of oral interpreters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This way of working is of course economically reasonable and in many ways practical, but 
necessarily a linguistic shortcut, using the term of the European Commission (2004: 20), which 
requires major activity of quality control. Another way of reducing the costs is to use private 
agencies to translate ‘less essential documents’ (European Commission 2004: 20).  
When a text goes through two steps of translation it is highly probable that the meaning 
will change perhaps even twice. The ambiguity invoked in every language becomes especially 
marked when trying to translate different constructions. This is obvious when translating 
between languages with different degrees of grammatical markings, like German and Swedish. 
The German case marking has to be translated with use of other grammatical functions and this 
could make the texts less clearly. Despite these differences, though, it is possible to make good 
translations between most languages (Koller 2004), and the hypothesis that all languages are 
identical on a certain level of abstraction (Chomsky 1986), makes this even more plausible. In 
principle it should be able to express the same things in different languages (Koller 2004: 181, 
183). We therefore assume that this is the situation, and ignore some of the difficulties this 
assumption creates. 
The EU has 1 650 full time translators and each of them have specialised in translating 
documents about particular areas of the Commission’s work (DGT: 4).4 Problem arises when 
certain concepts are to be translated or expressed. Fossum (2003: 332) shows an example of how 
different lexical entities have different meaning in different languages. When the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights was drafted there was a dispute about whether there should be 
any reference to religion as a European value. The French version was adapted, and it contains 
‘spirituelle’ instead of ‘religieuse’, whereas the German and Dutch versions were not, and contain 
                                                 
 
4
 See DGT (2005) for a full overview of the different areas. 
 
A NATIONAL 
LANGUAGE 
 
THE (SIX) PIVOT 
LANGUAGES 
 
ALL 20 
LANGUAGES 
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‘geistig-religios’. Hence, we have two versions of the Charter where the words have different 
connotations. According to Fossum (2003), this reveals that the Charter is not written in the 
spirit of deep diversity, as could be argued, and that each language has different contexts that the 
versions are translated into. It is more naturally to write ‘geistig-religios’ in German and Holland 
than in France. 
Although semantics is a mental phenomenon, this does not mean that every word has an 
equal meaning in every language. In an ideal situation, the latter would have been the case. 
Instead, some words are colored by e.g. political parties and also because of historical 
developments within a country. One of the problems concerning translation concerns just this. 
Not only is a concept like for example ‘market economy’ presupposed differently within the 
countries, the translation creates further difficulties especially when translating the context of the 
word. However, this problem is small and rarely becomes pertinent. It is necessary to focus on 
the main factors, and as such are these words not important for the overall development of the 
Union. 
A shared collective identity does not presuppose a lingua franca but this identity can not be 
of the same character as the nation- or regionally based identities. The reason for the former is 
translation and the ability to transfer the meaning of the main ‘European ideas’. This is not saying 
that this ability creates a public engagement and thereby gets the people of Europe interested in 
the concepts of the Union. People can have more than one identity and the linguistic diversity is 
not an obstacle for creating this. It may be possible to transform the context of meaning into the 
Union as a whole, so that issues are presented in such a way that they create a common 
understanding which is identifiable for the common European.5  
 We can never secure against the abuse of ambiguity, after all ambiguity is a result of the 
fact that humans understand things differently. Even if the European Union adopted one 
language as its main language, this would not stop politicians and other opinion makers of 
interpreting their own meaning of different concepts. A well known example is the way different 
parties uses various words when describing their opponents and the way ‘liberalism’ is interpreted 
at the right and at the left in many party systems.  
It is also a fact that most Europeans do not read documents from the Union at all and 
therefore they probably do not have much effect on the public. The difficulties emerging in 
communicating a joint understanding of the work done by the EU’s own institutions is not that 
                                                 
 
5
 Concerning the means of translation it would be even simpler if the translators were able to translate the special 
concepts using words which would mean approximately the same in different countries. This makes the process 
much harder and not at least more dependent on the individuals that perform the translations. Remember also 
that each translator is specialised in one area and thereby having good knowledge about the area in question. 
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important concerning just language. There are more severe challenges, for instance whether the 
EU has chosen the best way of organising its democratic institutions when it comes to engage the 
electorates etc. 
 What then about the identity we have mentioned several times without specifying? This 
identity can not likely be of any post-national sort, like Fossum (2001) argues in favor of, since 
this would presuppose that the institution had a clear amount of nation-like-characteristics (cf. 
above). It has not. As shown in figure 6, where European citizens at the time of the last 
enlargement were asked to rank their feeling of being European in relation to their national 
identity, national identities are far stronger than a common European identity all across today’s 
Union.  
Figure 6 National identity first 
(percentage)
62
62
61
57
57
56
53
53
51
50
49
48
48
46
45
44
42
42
42
42
41
40
39
38
34
32
30
29
27
Finland
UK
Hungary
Turkey
Greece
Sweden
Lithuania
Austria
Czech Rep.
Netherland
Cyprus
Ireland
Portugal
Bulgaria
Poland
Estonia
Slovenia
EU 25
Denmark
Belgium
Latvia
Germany
Slovakia
Romania
Spain
Malta
France
Luxembour
Italy
 
Source: Eurobarometer 61, May 2004.  
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This is as expected due to languages and other factors. The historical circumstances of each 
nation-state is important (like Rokkan emphasised), and it seems like the European identity 
largely is constructed without the great impact of languages. Diversity among the languages 
makes it possible to construct an identity in the first place, but it is not among the core 
ingredients in the identity. What these core ingredients are is opaque at present, but we think they 
have to do with geographical and governmental issues. Europe is distinct from the other parts of 
the world, and the way most people conceive of the Union is through governmental issues that 
interact in they daily life. The question we are left with then is what kind of consequences this 
have for the way European integration is being described and explained? 
 
Defending democratic diversity 
We have argued that a variety of languages is not an obstacle towards a common European 
identity because translation can build bridges and make it possible to create some sort of a 
common European discourse without a single language. The last point we want to discuss, is the 
effort of the Union on saving national languages. This has made the European Union a defender 
of democratic diversity, because it is always an advantage to use one’s own language (Kymlicka 
2001). However, there is a huge difference between saying that this is an advantage and that the 
Union should adopt one common language. The former makes it possible to retain linguistic 
diversity and multiple identities whereas the latter does not. Importantly, since the EU builds on 
this point, we will focus on three levels where the Union functions as a defender of democratic 
diversity: the regional, nation-state and the European institutions themselves. 
 Regional and minority languages have for long received much support from the 
European Union. The engagement has created results, as we now see minority languages gaining 
strength and increase in use (see the results reported in Trenz 2005). In fact, as can be seen from 
figure 7, 63 percent of EU citizens say that they totally or tend to agree that regional and minority 
languages should receive greater support in the Union (European Commission 2006: 60).  
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Figure 7 European integration and language diversity 
(percent)
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The effort on this issue is important on the grounds that it makes it possible for people having a 
minority language as their native language to easier participate in the current debates. Not at least 
is it valuable to feel recognised because one’s own language is just as much valued as other’s. 
Hence it is an important identity factor and a part of the democratisation. If the Union can 
contribute to strengthen regional and local identities, it makes it easier to develop a variety of a 
European one. If people are aware of the contribution made by the Union in such cases, they 
might also change their attitudes towards the Union and thereby feel more like belonging to a 
greater society, that is, to feel more European. 
 On the nation-state level the European Union is also a guarantor of democratic diversity. 
Since the Union has not adopted one language of communication, it has made it possible for the 
member states to retain their national languages and thereby for people to keep on using their 
mother tongue. If the EU translated all treaties and directives into one of its three main 
languages, and these had to be incorporated into each nation-state’s legislation in their original 
language, this would quickly have contributed to transform the governments’ use of language and 
thereby also ordinary people’s language (Lohndal 2006). Inasmuch as this has not happened, the 
member states have been able to continue using their own languages in legislation and within the 
government.  
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As an example, consider the Draft Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, which 
was translated into all official languages. The immense debate this Treaty created had not been 
possible if not this translation had happened. The use of vernaculars is therefore very important 
in order to maintain a good and healthy democracy, says Will Kymlicka (2001): If the parliaments 
had to use another language whenever debating legislative matters, this would damage the 
process of decision making. Because people very rarely have the same competence in a foreign 
language as in their native language, they are not able to communicate on the same high level and 
with the same nuances. Therefore, democracy and the vernacular are in tight connection: 
 
Democratic politics is politics in the vernacular. The average citizen feels at ease only 
when he discusses political questions in his own language. As a general rule, only elites are 
fluent in more than one language and have the chance to maintain and develop their 
linguistic skills continuously and feel at ease discussing political questions in different 
languages in a multilingual atmosphere (Kymlicka 2001: 214). 
 
 
This does not entail that the European Union itself is undemocratic. Quite the opposite proves 
true (Lord 2004). As we have seen, many means are used in order to create diversity in the 
European institutions by way of translation, for instance for the members of the European 
Parliament who can use their own languages and still make themselves perfectly understood in 
the assembly. 
 The EU seems to accumulate the efforts put on the regional and national levels and to 
institutionalise the dualism between the particular and the universal. The Union deals with agreed 
upon opinions and creates a common foundation for its member states while the particulars are 
handled in each member state and by regional institutions in member states with a federal 
character. The linguistic diversity makes democracy in the European Union possible because 
language and identity are intertwined in a special way, where the latter mainly depends on the 
former. United in diversity seems to be particularly well formulated, as the diversity in fact creates 
the foundation for the unity to exist. As long as history and the trajectories of identity formation 
(Rokkan 1975, 1983, 1999) can not be ignored, further developments can not start from scratch, 
but from the already established formations. The European Union has recognized this important 
fact and thereby made it possible for itself to expand further according to its vision of ‘an ever 
closer Union’ in Europe. 
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Conclusion 
Language has a huge impact on identity formation and therefore must be considered vital when 
looking at the development of the European Union. The European identity is mainly constructed 
without the impact of a common language and is thereby weaker than any of the member-state or 
regional identities which are highly connected with language. But a lingua franca is not necessary to 
create a common European identity insofar as translations are able to transfer the discourses of 
the Union among its member states. Ambiguity is anyhow present, which would not have created 
any ‘thicker’ identity formation within a lingua franca because such a trajectory could be even more 
filled with large obstacles. The motto United in diversity illustrates that the language diversity 
creates the foundation for the EU to grow further towards an ‘ever closer Union’ and defending 
democratic diversity in Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
References 
 
 
Aardal, Bernt and Ragnar Waldahl (2004) ‘Political Cleavages in a Media-Driven 
Environment’, pp. 245-271, in Narud, Hanne Marthe and Anne Krogstad (eds), Elections, 
Parties, and Political Representation. Festschrift for Professor Henry Valen’s 80th Anniversary. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Archibugi, Daniele (2005) The Language of Democracy: Vernacular or Esperanto? A 
Comparision between the Multiculturalist and the Cosmopolitan Perspectives. Political 
Studies 53: 537-555. 
 
Bakke, Elisabeth (1995) ‘Mot ein europeisk identitet?’ Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, no. 
4: 467-494. 
 
Bartolini, Stefano (2005) Restructuring Europe. Centre formation, system building, and 
political structuring between the nation state and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Bulmer, Simon and Christian Lequesne (2005) ‘The European Union and its Member-States: 
An Overview’, pp. 1-20, in Bulmer, Simon and Christian Lequesne (eds), The Member 
States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Burgess, Michael (2000) Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950- 
2000. London: Routledge. 
 
Corbellari, Marianne Derron (2005) ‘Die Übersetzung des Historischen Lexikons der 
Schweiz. Ein Unternehmen von sprachpolitischer Bedeutung’. Linguistik online 23, no. 2: 
99-114 
 
Elazar, Daniel J. (1968) ‘Federalism’. In D. Sills 8ed.): International Encyclopedia of the  
Social Sciences. The Macmillan Company & The Free Press. 
 
Elazar, Daniel J. (1995) ‘From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift’. The Journal of  
Federalism, 25 (2), Spring: 5-18. 
 
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Erik Fossum (2004) ‘Europe in Search of Legitimacy: 
Strategies of Legitimation Assessed’. International Political Science Review 25, no. 4: 435-459. 
 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1991) Languages at the margins of modernity. Linguistic 
minorities and the nation-state. Oslo: PRIO Reports # 5. 
 
European Commission (2006) Europeans and their Languages. Special Eurobarometer 243.  
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
 
European Commission (2006) The future of Europe. Special Eurobarometer 251.  
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
 
 
 
 
23  
European Commission (2004) Many tongues, one family. Languages in the European Union. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Directorate-General for Translation of the European Commission [DGT] (2005) 
‘Translating for a Multilingual Community’ 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/translation/index_en.htm, April 2005. 
 
European Commission (2006) Europeans and their languages. Special Eurobarometer, 
February 2006. 
 
Flora, Peter (with Stein Kuhnle and Derek Urwin) (eds) (1999) State Formation, Nation 
Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Fossum, John Erik (2001) ‘Identity-politics in the European Union’. Journal of European 
Integration, no. X: 373-406. 
 
Fossum, John Erik (2003) ‘The European Union. In Search of an Identity’. European Journal 
of Political Theory 2, no. 3: 319-340. 
 
Grindheim, Jan Erik (1996) ‘Die Europäische Union: von der funktionalen zur territorialen 
Integration?’: 145-167, in Linder, Wolf, Prisca Lanfranchi and Ewald R. Weibel (eds), 
Schweizer Eigenart – eigenartige Schweiz. Der Kleinstaat im Kräftefeld der europäischen Integration. 
Berlin: Der Akademischen Kommission der Universität Bonn. 
 
Grindheim, Jan Erik (1998) ‘Europeisk regionalisering og norsk regionalpolitikk i 1990 
årene – aktører, strategier, prosesser’. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift 1(14): 38-66. 
 
Grindheim, Jan Erik (2004) ‘The European Constitution from a Citizen Perspective”, in  
Krassimir Nikolov (ed), Views from the outside: The European Union between a constitution and 
parliamentary elections, conference papers. Sofia: Bulgarian European Community Studies 
Association  
 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001) ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ New Left Review, 11: 5-26. 
 
Holsen, Sjur S. (1998) ‘Europeisk integrasjon og nasjonal identitet. Et blikk på mulighetene 
for å utvikle et europeisk medborgerskap, pp. 20-42, in Grindheim, Jan Erik (ed), EU. Fra 
økonomisk fellesskap til politisk union. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Keating, Michael (2001) Plurinational democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty 
Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Koller, Werner. 2004. Einführung in die Übersetzungswissenschaft. Wiebelsheim: Quelle & 
Meyer. 
 
Kumm, Mattias (2005) ‘To be a European Citizen: Constitutional Patriotism and the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe’, pp. 7-63, in Eriksen, Erik Oddvar, John Erik 
Fossum, Mattias Kumm and Agustín José Menéndez, The European Constitution: the Rubicon 
Crossed? ARENA Report 03/05. 
 
Kymlicka, Will (2001) Politics in the Vernacular. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 24 
Linder, Wolf (1994) Swiss Democracy. St. Martin's Press. 
 
Lohndal, Terje (2006) Stat, styring og språk. Stat og styring 16, no. 2: 4-5. 
 
Lord, Christopher (1998) Democracy in the European Union. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press Ltd. 
 
Lord, Christopher (2003) ‘Auditing Democracy in the European Union’, Paper Presented at 
Agder University College. 
 
Lord, Christopher (2004) A Democratic Audit of the European Union. London: Routledge. 
 
Rokkan, Stein (1971) ‘Nation-Building. A Review of Models and Approaches’. Current 
Sociology 19, no. 3: 7-38. 
 
Rokkan, Stein (1975) ‘Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible 
Paradigm for Research on Variation within Europe’, pp. XXX-XXX, in Tilly, Charles 
(ed), The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Rokkan, Stein and Derek W. Urwin (1983) Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West 
European Peripheries. London: Sage. 
 
Rugeldal, Caroline (2003) Identitetsbygging i EU. En analyse av EUs symbolstrategi. 
ARENA Report 04/03. 
 
Safran, William (1997) ‘Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to  
Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community’. International Political 
Science Review. 18 (3), pp. 313-335 
 
Schlesinger, Philip (1997) ‘From cultural defence to political culture: media, politics and 
collective identity in the European Union’. Media, Culture & Society 19: 369-391. 
 
Schlesinger, Philip (2005) ‘The Babel of Europe? An Essay on Networks and Communicative 
Spaces’. Ms. 
 
Smith, Anthony D (1991) National Identity. London: Penguin. 
 
Sweeney, Simon (2005) Europe, the State and Globalisation. London: Pearson Longman. 
 
Thomassen, Jacques and Hermann Schmitt (2004) ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the 
European Union’, pp. 375-399, in Narud, Hanne Marthe and Anne Krogstad (eds), 
Elections, Parties, and Political Representation. Festschrift for Professor Henry Valen’s 80th 
Anniversary. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Trenz, Hans-Jörg (2005) Language Minorities in Europe: Dying species or forerunner of a 
transnational civil society? ARENA Working Paper 20/05. 
 
Wincott, Daniel (1996) ‘Federalism and the European Union: The Scope and Limits of the  
Treaty of  Maastricht’. International Political Science Review. 17 (4), PP. 403-415 
 
25  
Authors 
 
 
Jan Erik Grindheim is Associate Professor in Centre for European Studies, Agder University 
College and Researcher II in Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen.  
 
Terje Lohndal is a student of linguistics in Department of Scandinavian and Linguistic 
Studies, University of Oslo.
 
Contact information:  
 
E-mail: Jan.E.Grindheim@hia.no 
 
Tel. + 47 38 14 10 97 
 
Centre for European Studies 
Agder University College 
Service Box 422 
NO-4604 Kristiansand 
